DHS Unveils Plan to Bolster Election Security Ahead of 2026

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has announced the release of its 2026 Election Infrastructure Security Plan, titled “Securing the Next 250.” This comprehensive plan outlines a range of voluntary, no-cost resources designed to assist election officials in enhancing the security and resilience of the nation’s voting systems. The initiative, directed by DHS Secretary Markwayne Mullin, aims to safeguard the integrity of the democratic process.

Per a press release from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, the “Securing the Next 250” plan details the availability of services offered by the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) at no cost to election officials. These services include the sharing of threat intelligence, provision of technical expertise, vulnerability scanning, and other forms of risk-mitigation support. The overarching goal is to fortify election infrastructure against evolving threats.

The security of election infrastructure is recognized as a critical component of national security. This designation, established in 2017, has prompted an expansion of CISA’s support to state and local election officials. The agency has been actively delivering a suite of cybersecurity and physical security services to help protect the processes, technologies, facilities, and personnel involved in elections. The newly released plan consolidates and articulates these offerings, addressing a spectrum of potential threats to election operations.

The plan details the multifaceted nature of election infrastructure, which includes physical components like voting locations, technical facilities, storage facilities, processing facilities, administrative offices, and voting hardware such as ballots and poll books. Technological components are equally critical, encompassing state and local networks, voter registration systems, election management systems, tabulation systems, results reporting mechanisms, public information systems, electronic poll books, and internal production software and servers. The human element is also recognized as a key factor, with specific attention paid to strategic and operational positions held by elected and appointed officials, as well as temporary or seasonal support staff, whose roles are essential to the smooth functioning of the election process.

A significant portion of the plan is dedicated to addressing the election infrastructure threat landscape. It highlights cybersecurity vulnerabilities, including those stemming from outdated certification regimes, inconsistent vendor transparency regarding vulnerabilities, and the general cybersecurity immaturity of many state and local networks. CISA recommends measures such as harmonizing patch management and certification requirements, utilizing paper ballots with robust audit trails, encouraging software providers to assign CVE numbers, promptly notify customers of source code leaks, report incidents, and provide a software bill of materials (SBOM).

The security of voter registration databases is also a major concern, with reports indicating that these systems are attractive targets for foreign adversaries. CISA advises implementing multi-factor authentication, network monitoring, role-based access controls, comprehensive logging, and architectural separation of public-facing services from master databases. Insider threats, both intentional and unintentional, are identified as a growing risk, impacting permanent staff, temporary workers, volunteers, contractors, and vendors. Mitigation strategies include formalizing existing practices like bipartisan ballot handling and observer presence into documented insider-threat programs, as well as close coordination with the FBI.

Furthermore, the plan addresses threats to the physical security of election infrastructure, citing incidents such as suspicious mailings and bomb threats directed at election offices. CISA recommends maintaining procedures for handling mail and responding to potential hazardous materials, along with comprehensive training for personnel. The agency also tracks election-related incidents, including bomb threats and suspicious packages, and provides support through exercises, training, and physical security assessments. Key findings from CISA’s exercises emphasize the importance of strong relationships among election officials and federal partners, the development of robust incident response and continuity of operations plans, and the promotion of transparency and trust in election offices.

Through initiatives such as information sharing, comprehensive risk assessments, targeted training programs, vulnerability scanning, and collaborative exercises, CISA works to empower election partners. These efforts are geared towards strengthening the resilience of election systems and, consequently, bolstering public confidence in the integrity of the voting process. The DHS and CISA maintain a commitment to providing ongoing support to state and local election officials as they undertake the crucial task of protecting election infrastructure.

The full plan is available on the DHS website.

Article by Mel Anara, based upon information from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security

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